June 16

Webinar takeaway: Learn to Detect and Defend Against Supply Chain Attacks Before They Compromise Your Network

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My key takeaways

  • First trojan probably was implemented 1983 by Ken Thompson, who invented Unix, C,..
  • He also warned back then: "You can’t trust code that you did not totally create yourself"
  • Brand new hardware from the factory can be infected by malicious code as well
  • Also open source software is constantly compromised
    • example of a free website counter enforcing a backlink, first to a nice picture, then unnoticed to a malicious JS file
    • WP Plugin "SEOPressor" implementing a backdoor as well
  • The creator of PHP is named Rasmus Lerdorf
  • A security scan of well known programming languages revealed:
  • Beware of package typosquatting:
    • naming a malicious package like a well known and widely used one, so used if
      • the developer has a typo like "atlas-client" instead of "atlas_client"
      • a developer looks in a repo like pypi for a package misspelling the package he is looking for
  • Roger Grimes was involved in the forensics of the 2011 RSA attack
    • He believes the seed for the RSA SecurID token was stolen (Others say nay)
    • and used to break in at e.g. Lockheed Martin
  • Great image of the timeline for the Solarwinds supply chain attack
    • 425 of the US Fortune 500 companies have been affacted
    • a teardrop attack as the malware created a lot of different malicious files over the time
    • they had some 0d for M$ and VMware and bypassed MFA as well
  • Why are these attacks so hard to detect
    • often implanted in sources you could and have trusted for a long time before
    • malware uses encrpytion to call home
  • Prevention is preferred over detection
  • Social engineering (SE) is responsible for 70-90% of breaches
    • second is unpatched software
  • Best defenses to not let them in
    • mitigate SE
    • Patch Internet-accessible software
    • Use non-guessable passwords/multifactor authentication (MFA)
    • Use Least-Permissive Permissions
    • Aggressive monitoring, anomaly detection, and alerting
  • Developers should not reuse code they can not inspect and approve as "backdoor free" <- IMPOV: unrealistic
  • Most developer (cough, cough) have accidently leaked some credentials eg on Github
  • run eg Process Explorer to inspect whats on your machine
  • Look for anomalies!
    • in network traffic
    • in processes
    • in login attempts
  • Do a "heartbeat" test: send a potentially malicious file to a system and watch it the alert goes off
    • if not, inspect why
  • Honeypots are probably one of the most underrated and underused deception technique, according to Roger Grimes

Env


Tags

blue team, social engineering, solarburst, supply chain


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